Quantum Histories and their Implications by Kent, A
DAMTP/96-74 (revised)
gr-qc/9607073
Quantum Histories and Their Implications
Adrian Kent1
Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics,
University of Cambridge,
Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EW, U.K.
Abstract
Classical mechanics and standard Copenhagen quantum mechanics respect standard
subspace implications: for example, if a particle is known to be conned in a particular
region of space, then it follows that it is conned in any larger region containing the rst.
However, subspace implications are not generally valid in formulations of quantum theory
that assign probabilities to histories. For example, there are physical situations in which,
using two dierent sets in the consistent histories formalism, one can conclude either that
the system state is denitely in a given subspace A of the state space at a given time or
that the system state is denitely not in a larger subspace B  A. This raises the question
as to whether, if quantum theory applies to the macroscopic realm and is taken as a theory
which attaches probabilities to sequences of events, we have compelling theoretical reasons
to expect the physics we actually observe to respect subspace implications. I give here
a new criterion, ordered consistency, with the property that inferences made by ordered
consistent sets do not violate subspace relations. The criterion allows a precise version
of the question to be formulated: do the operators dening our observations form an
ordered consistent history? If the answer is yes, the criterion denes an apparently natural






We take it for granted that we can infer quantitatively less precise statements from
our observations. If we observe a solar eclipse between times t and t0, but nd it helpful to
do rough calculations in which we replace t0 by a later time t00, our subsequent predictions
of celestial mechanics may have greater error bars than necessary, but we believe they
will not be wrong. If we are told that an atom is conned in some region of space, but
assume for calculational purposes only that it lies in some larger region containing the rst,
we naturally realise that the imprecision may weaken our conclusions, but believe it will
not make them false. Our understanding of the world and our interpretation of everyday
experience tacitly rely on this sort of inference.
Common sense aside, at rst sight the theoretical justication for these assumptions
seems solid. In classical mechanics, they follow directly from the correspondence between
physical states and points in phase space: if the state of a system lies in a subset S1 of
phase space, it lies in all subsets S2  S1. Similarly, in Copenhagen quantum theory, if the
state of a quantum system lies in a subspace H1 of Hilbert space, it lies in all subspaces
H2  H1.
On the other hand, neither classical mechanics nor Copenhagen quantum theory is
believed to be fundamentally correct. If the basic principles of quantum theory apply to
the universe as a whole, then some more fundamental interpretation of quantum theory
is needed, and any justication of the subspace implications must ultimately rely on the
properties of that as yet unknown interpretation. It may seem hard to imagine how
to develop any useful science, or indeed to describe the world at all, without allowing
deductions of the type mentioned above. But, as explained below, we cannot take it
absolutely for granted that any given approach to quantum theory will respect subspace
implications: there are versions of quantum theory which cannot easily be excluded by
empirical observation and in which these implications lead to logical contradiction. In
particular, this is generally true of formulations of quantum theory that assign probabilities
to histories | that is, to sequences of events taking place at dierent moments in time, or
in dierent regions of space-time.
This paper addresses the question as to whether it is possible to dene versions of the
quantum theory of closed systems which use some standard quantum representation for
collections of observed events in dierent regions of spacetime, which assign probabilities
to histories, which are consistent with empirical observation, and which respect subspace
implications between the allowed sets of propositions.
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In principle the question can be asked about any historical formulation of quantum
theory. I will focus here on the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, origi-
nally developed by Griths[1], Omnes[2], and Gell-Mann and Hartle[3].
Much work has been devoted in recent years to investigating the properties and physi-
cal implications of the consistent histories approach. It is impossible to give a fully adequate
summary here, but as the ideas of this paper can be partly motivated by the problems
raised by the existing formalism, a brief account of those problems, as I see them, follows.2
It should be stressed, though, that the discussion in the rest of the paper can be inde-
pendently motivated, and does not rely on any particular view of the existing consistent
histories formalism.
The one unequivocally positive conclusion to emerge from investigations to date is
that it appears at least plausible that, given a model of any familiar physical process,
some exactly consistent set of histories can be found which makes the right probabilistic
predictions for the physical outcomes we actually observe.
On the other hand, any sensible model admits description by an innite number of
exactly consistent sets. These descriptions are generally incompatible with each other, and
nearly all of them make probabilistic predictions for outcomes which are incompatible with
those we actually observe.
Hence the set selection problem: probabilistic predictions can only be made condi-
tional on a choice of consistent set, yet the consistent histories formalism gives no way of
singling out any particular set or sets as physically interesting.
The problem remains essentially unaltered if the predictions are conditioned on a large
collection of data[6], and even if predictions are made conditional on approximately classical
physics being observed[7]. The present version of the consistent histories formalism thus
seems too weakly predictive in almost all plausible physical situations to be considered a
useful scientic theory.
One possible solution to the set selection problem would be an axiom which identies
a unique physically interesting set, or perhaps a class of such sets, from the initial state
and the dynamics. Another would be the identication of a physically natural measure
on the space of consistent sets, according to which the physically relevant consistent set
is randomly chosen. Possible set selection criteria have been investigated[8,9], but no
2 More optimistic assessments of the present state of the formalism can be found elsewhere[e.g.
3,4,5].
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generally workable criterion has yet been found. Possible ways of identifying physically
interesting sub-classes of consistent sets have also recently been investigated by Gell-Mann
and Hartle[10]. Though Gell-Mann and Hartle are motivated by the need to characterise
more precisely the notion of quasiclassicality within the consistent histories formalism,
rather than by any perceived inadequacy of the existing formalism, their denitions might
of course be taken as steps towards a set selection criterion by those who see the need for
one. Their ideas too, though, seem as yet far from resolving the problem.
Another surprising and problematic feature of the consistent histories formalism, of
particular relevance here, is its disrespect for subspace implications. As explained below,
it is easy to construct examples in which subspace implications which would be standard
in Copenhagen quantum theory, and which intuitively appear natural, lead directly to log-
ical contradiction in the consistent histories formalism. One can, for example, construct a
simple three slit experiment, with disjoint slits A, B and C, in which it leads to contra-
diction to infer from the statement that a particle went through slit A the statement that
it went through one of slits A and B. This, to those who take seriously the intuition that
this sort of inference ought to be allowed in a sensible interpretation of quantum theory,
is of course in itself an argument against the existing consistent histories formalism. It
also highlights what seems an unnaturally arbitrary choice in the denition of consistent
sets of histories[11]. The formalism is dened in such a way as to make it impossible for
contradictory propositions to be inferrable in dierent consistent sets | we can never,
reasoning from the same data in two dierent sets, conclude that a particle lies in some
region and its complement. Yet the formalism allows contrary propositions to be inferred
| we can nd examples in which, reasoning from the same data in two dierent sets, we
conclude that the particle lies in one or the other of two disjoint regions.
In this paper I describe a renement of the consistent histories formalism, which
uses a new criterion in addition to consistency. This new criterion denes a version of
quantum theory which restricts attention to a sub-class of consistent sets of histories |
the ordered consistent sets of histories. Subspace implications between any pair of ordered
consistent histories lead to no contradiction, whether or not these histories belong to the
same consistent set.
A formalism based on ordered consistent sets of histories obviously denes a more
strongly predictive version of quantum theory than that dened by the existing consistent
histories framework, since it allows strictly fewer sets as possible descriptions of physics.
A key question, of course, is whether it still allows at least one set which describes our
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empirical observations. It may prove hard to answer this question denitively | although
ordered consistent sets are shown below to be adequate in some simple models | since
to do so may ultimately require a more precise understanding of quasiclassicality than we
presently have.
However, one of the main points of this paper | and the main reason for taking a
particular interest in the properties of ordered consistent sets | is that either answer leads
to an interesting conclusion.
If our empirical observations can be accounted for by the predictions of an ordered
consistent set, then the ordered consistent sets formalism supersedes the current versions of
the consistent histories formalism as a predictive theory. Alternatively, if the predictions of
ordered consistent histories quantum theory are false, then either the consistent histories
framework uses entirely the wrong language to describe histories of events in quantum
theory, or we cannot generally rely on subspace implications in analysing our observations.
Either of these last two possibilities would have far-reaching implications for our un-
derstanding of nature. It is true that other ways of representing quantum histories are
known than those used in the consistent histories formalism, but they arise either in non-
standard versions of quantum theory, such as de Broglie{Bohm theory, or in alternative
theories. It is also true that there is no way of logically excluding the possibility that
subspace implications generally fail to hold. Any clear violation would, however, lead to
radical changes in our representation of the world, and in particular to our understanding
of the relation between theory and empirical observation.
2. Quantum Histories
It will be assumed here that any sensible version of quantum theory assigns probabil-
ities to histories: that is, to collections of events. These events may form a time-ordered
sequence in the non-relativistic theory; in the relativistic theory they will generally be
attached to dierent, perhaps overlapping, regions of space-time. There are several rea-
sonably standard ways of representing an event in quantum theory. The simplest, and
probably most familiar, is as a projection operator, labelled by a particular time, corre-
sponding to a statement about an observable in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. For
example, the statement that a given particle was in the interval I at time t is formally






It has long been known that we need to go beyond this standard description of an event
to describe general experimental observations in Copenhagen quantum theory. A more
general theory of unsharp measurements is dened by so-called quantum eects, corre-
sponding to operators A such that A and I − A are both positive.3 Though it is not
obvious that quantum eects are required in a fundamental formulation of the quantum
theory of closed systems, it is possible and potentially interesting to include them[13,14].
Another interesting class of statement can be dened, at least formally, in the path integral
version of quantum theory by restrictions of the path integral. For example, by considering
the appropriate integrals one can attach probabilities to the events that a particle did, or
did not, enter a particular region of space-time[15].
As Isham, Linden and collaborators have stressed in their abstract algebraic develop-
ment of the consistent histories formalism[16,17,18], further natural generalisations can be
dened by representing multi-time propositions as projections in a tensor product of the
original Hilbert space. The simplest example of such generalised events is the representa-
tion of a composite event | corresponding, for example, to the statement that a particle
was in the interval I1 at time t1 and in the interval I2 at time t2 | by the tensor product
of the relevant projection operators. Isham and Linden also consider events dened by in-
homogeneous projections, which are sums of such tensor products but not tensor products
themselves. Exotic events, which correspond to projections in the tensor product Hilbert
space that are neither homogeneous nor inhomogeneous, are also allowed. Again, while it
is not obvious that inhomogeneous or exotic events are required in a fundamental formu-
lation of quantum theory, it would be interesting to understand the physical implications
of including them.4
There is a natural ordering corresponding to each of these representations. In the case
of projection operators, we take A  B if the range of B is a subspace of that of A. This
corresponds to the logical implication of Copenhagen quantum theory mentioned earlier:
if the state of a quantum system lies in the range of B, then it necessarily lies in the range
of A. The ordering generalises to quantum eects: here A  B if and only if (A − B) is
also a quantum eect. The relations among space-time regions similarly dene a logical
ordering in the case of position space path integral statements: if R1  R2, then we take
the statement that a particle entered R1 to imply the statement that it entered R2.
3 For a recent review, see for example Ref. [12].
4 Work in this area is in progress[19,20].
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Given any good denition of a quantum event, we dene a quantum history as a
collection of events in such a way that the ordering on quantum events naturally extends to
an ordering on quantum histories. Thus a quantum history could be dened by a sequence
of projections or positive operators at dierent moments in time in non-relativistic quantum
mechanics, or by a collection of statements attached to dierent regions in the path integral
formulation of quantum theory. Then, taking the rst case for example, we can compare
two quantum histories H = fA1; t1; : : : ;An; tng and H 0 = fA01; t
0





We rst add to each history the identity operator at every time at which it contains no
proposition and the other does, so obtaining relabelled representations of the histories
as H = fA1; t1; : : : ;AN ; tNg and H 0 = fA01; t1; : : : ;A
0
N ; tNg, and then dene a partial
ordering by taking H  H 0 if and only if Ai  A0i for all i and H > H
0 if H  H 0 and
H 6= H 0.5
The consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, reviewed below, uses a math-
ematical criterion | consistency | to select out a class of quantum histories | the
consistent histories | which are taken to be those of physical relevance. Consistent his-
tories are those which belong to a consistent set of histories | a complete set of mutually
exclusive and (roughly speaking) non-interfering alternative histories. The formulation
denes probability weights for individual consistent histories, and these weights dene a
probability distribution on each consistent set. A consistent histories approach can be
developed for each of the denitions of history discussed above.
Despite the problems noted earlier, the consistent histories formulation seems to me
the best developed and most interesting approach to closed system quantum histories that
maintains the standard dynamics and that is dened by some standard representation of
events.6 In the following discussion, quantum histories are taken to be consistent histories
whose individual events are dened by projection operators at a single moment in time. The
basic ideas, though, are meant to apply, mutatis mutandis, to any denition of quantum
history which is intrinsic to the operator or path integral formulations of quantum theory
and for which there is a natural notion of probability weight.
5 This ordering was rst considered in the consistent histories literature by Isham and
Linden[17], who also | as we will discuss later | examined aspects of its relationship to other
properties of consistent and inconsistent quantum histories.
6 For discussions of other potentially interesting approaches to quantum histories, see Ref. [21]
and Section VII of Ref. [6].
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3. Consistent Sets of Histories
The consistent sets of histories for a closed quantum system are dened in terms of
the space of states H, the initial density matrix , and the hamiltonian H. In the simplest
version of the consistent histories formulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, sets
of histories correspond to sets of projective decompositions. In order to be able to give
a physical interpretation of any of the consistent sets, we need also to assume that stan-
dard observables, such as position, momentum and spin, are given. Individual quantum
events are dened by members of projective decompositions of the identity into orthogonal
hermitian projections  = fP ig, withX
i
P i = 1 and P iP j = ijP
i : (3:1)
Each such decomposition denes a complete and exclusive list of events at some xed time,
and a time label is thus generally attached to the decompositions and the projections: the
labels are omitted here, since the properties of interest here depend only on the time
ordering of events.
Suppose now we have a set of decompositions S = f1; : : : ; ng. Then the histories
given by choosing one projection from each of the decompositions j in all possible ways
dene an exhaustive and exclusive set of alternatives. We use Gell-Mann and Hartle’s
decoherence condition, and say that S is a consistent set of histories if




1 : : : P
jn
n ) = i1j1 : : : injnp(i1 : : : in) : (3:2)
When S is consistent, p(i1 : : : in) is the probability of the history H = fP
i1
1 ; : : : ; P
in
n g. We
will want later to discuss the properties of individual histories without reference to any
xed consistent set, and we dene a consistent history to be a history which belongs to
some consistent set S. Finally, we say the set
S0 = f1; : : : ; k; ; k+1; : : : ; ng (3:3)
is a consistent extension of a consistent set of histories S = f1; : : : ; ng by the set of
projections  = fQi : i = 1; : : : ;mg if  is a projective decomposition and S0 is consistent.
Suppose now that we have a collection of data dened by the history




which has non-zero probability and belongs to the consistent set S. This history might,
for example, describe the results of a series of experiments or the observations made by
an observer. Given a choice of consistent extension S0 of S, we can make probabilistic
inferences conditioned on the historyH. For example, if S0 has the above form, the histories





k+1 ; : : : ; P
in
n g and the proposition Q
i has
conditional probability
p(QijH) = p(Hi)=p(H) : (3:5)
These probabilities and conditional probabilities are the same in every consistent set which
includes Hi and (hence) H. However, when we want to emphasize that the calculation
can be carried out in some particular set S, we will attach a sux. For example, we might
write pS0(Q
ijH) = pS0(Hi)=pS(H) for the above equation.
The formalism itself gives no way of choosing any particular consistent extension. In
the view of the original developers of the consistent histories approach, the dierent S0 are
to be thought of as ways of producing possible pictures of the past and future physics of the
system which, though generally incompatible, are all equally valid. More formally, they
can be seen as incompatible logical structures which allow dierent classes of inferences
from the data[4,5].
It is this freedom in the choice of consistent extension which, it has been argued
elsewhere[6,7,11,22,23,24,25] gives rise to the most serious problems in the consistent his-
tories approach. Standard probabilistic predictions and deterministic retrodictions can be
reproduced in the consistent histories formalism by making an ad hoc choice of consistent
set, but cannot be derived from the formalism itself. In fact, it is almost never possible
to make any unambiguous predictions or retrodictions: there are almost always an in-
nite number of incompatible consistent extensions of the set containing a given history
dataset[6,22].
The problem is not simply that the formalism supplies descriptions of physics which
are complementary in the standard sense, although that in itself is sucient to ensure that
the formalism is only very weakly predictive. There are deeper problems. For example,
even on the assumption that we will continue to observe quasiclassical physics, no known
interpretation of the formalism allows us to derive the predictions of classical mechanics
and Copenhagen quantum theory without adding further assumptions in the form of a set
selection axiom or axioms[7].
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4. Consistent Sets and Contrary Inferences
To explain another consequence, of most relevance for the discussion of this paper, it
is helpful to introduce a little logical terminology. We say that two projection operators
P and Q are complementary if they fail to commute: PQ 6= QP . We say that they are
contradictory if they sum to the identity, so that P = 1−Q and PQ = QP = 0. Finally, we
say that they are contrary if they are orthogonal and not contradictory, so that P < 1−Q
and again PQ = QP = 0.
The following example, taken from Ref. [11], shows that if (for example) a single
quantum measurement has been made on a system initially described by a pure state, and
if the outcome is one whose probability was less than 1=9, then two dierent consistent
extensions of the data | as dened by the measurement outcome | imply, with probability
one, contrary statements about the state of the system at the same moment in time.
We consider a quantum system whose hamiltonian is zero and whose Hilbert space
H has dimension greater than two, prepared in the state jai. Suppose that the system
is left undisturbed from time 0 until time t, when it is observed in the state jci, where
0 < jh a j c ij  1=3. In consistent histories language, we have initial density matrix
 = jaihaj and the single datum corresponding to the history H = fPcg from the consistent
set S = ffPc; 1− Pcgg, where the projection Pc = jcihcj is taken at time t.
Now consider consistent extensions of S of the form Sb = ffPb; 1−Pbg; fPc; 1−Pcgg,
where Pb = jbihbj=jh b j b ij for some unnormalised vector jbi with the property that
h c j b i h b j a i = h c j a i h b j b i : (4:1)
It is easy to verify that S0 is consistent and that the conditional probability of Pb given
H is 1. It is also easy to see that there are at least two mutually orthogonal vectors jbi
satisfying (4.1). For example, let jv1i; jv2i; jv3i be orthonormal vectors and take jai = jv1i








both satisfy (4.1) and are orthogonal if x is real and x22 = (x − 2)(1 − 2), which
has solutions for   1=3. Thus the consistent sets Sb give contrary probability one
retrodictions.
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This feature of the consistent histories formalism, though elementary, was noticed
only recently.7 It was rst explicitly pointed out, and its implications for the consistent
histories formalism were rst examined, in Ref. [11]. However, a noteworthy earlier consis-
tent histories analysis of an example in which contrary inferences arise appears in Cohen’s
critique[26] of Aharonov and Vaidman’s interpretation[27] of one of their intriguing exam-
ples of pre- and post-selection.8
Though the conclusion that consistent sets yield contrary inferences is undisputed,
some consistent historians prefer to express it in dierent language.9 As this can cause
confusion when its implications are discussed, it may be helpful to expand on the point a
little here.
It is not true that, in any given consistent set, two dierent contrary propositions can
be inferred with probability one. The inferences made within any given consistent set lead
to no contradiction; the picture of physics given by any given consistent set may or may
not be considered natural or plausible | depending on one’s intuition and the criteria
one uses for naturality | but it is not logically self-contradictory. It is however true, as
a mathematical statement about the properties of the consistent histories formalism, that
the propositions inferred in the two dierent sets correspond to contrary projections. As a
result, the formalism itself requires one to accept that two equally valid pictures of physics
can be given, in which contrary events take place.
Consistent historians maintain[e.g. 5] that this can be sensibly interpreted as follows.
By setting up rules of reasoning according to which, although physics can be described by
any of innitely many equally valid pictures, only one of those pictures may be considered
in any given argument, we can ensure that no logical contradiction can be reached, even if
the pictures in fact contain contrary inferences. For instance, if in one picture we predict
that a counter will detect three alpha particles, and in another we predict that the same
experiment will detect ve | as can be arranged in the time-neutral generalisation of
quantum theory proposed by Gell-Mann and Hartle[28] | consistent historians would
simply say that both predictions are equally valid | although, of course, at least one of
7 In particular, it was not known to the formalism’s original developers: I am grateful to Bob
Griths, Jim Hartle, and Roland Omnes for helpful correspondence on this point.
8 I am grateful to Oliver Cohen and Lucien Hardy for drawing Ref. [26] to my attention. As
noted in Ref. [11], its analysis contains an error, but one that does not aect the derivation of
contrary inferences.
9 See, for example, Ref. [5].
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them fails to describe the result we actually observe, and the formalism does not tell us
which, if either, is right.
Few would deny that the consistent histories formalism gives a set of rules for pro-
ducing possible pictures of physics within quantum theory, that these rules themselves
lead to no logical inconsistency, and that some (or at least one) of the pictures may be
scientically useful.
However, consistent historians go much further, arguing that the formalism denes
a natural and scientically unproblematic interpretation of quantum theory. Indeed, in
places the consistent histories literature seems to suggest that the descriptions of physics
given by consistent historians are simply and evidently the correct descriptions which
emerge from quantum theory, so that, in querying them, one necessarily queries quantum
theory itself.10
Yet this seems patently false. The most basic premise of consistent historians | that
quantum theory is correctly interpreted by some sort of many-picture scheme | leads to
such trouble in explaining which particular picture we see, and why, that cautious scep-
ticism seems only appropriate. Even if the premise were accepted, it would be essential
to ask, of any particular many-picture scheme, whether its assumptions are natural and
whether the descriptions of nature it produces are physically plausible or scientically
useful. The particular equations used to dene consistent sets are, after all, simply inter-
esting guesses: there is no compelling theoretical justication for them, and indeed, several
dierent denitions of consistency have been proposed[1,3,30].
My own view is that there are a number of compelling reasons for regarding the consis-
tent histories interpretation, as it is presently understood, as scientically unsatisfactory.
However, as these questions have been explored in some detail elsewhere[6,7,11,22-25],
I would like here only to comment briefly on two specic problems raised by contrary
inferences.
First, the fact that we are to take as equally valid and correct pictures of physics which
include contrary inferences goes against many well developed intuitions. No argument
based on intuition alone can be conclusive, but I think it must be granted that this one
has some force. What use, it may reasonably be asked, is there in saying that in one
picture of reality a particle genuinely went, with probability one, through slit A, and that
10 For example, the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics has been referred
to as \the interpretation of quantum mechanics"[4] and even as simply \quantum mechanics"[29].
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in another picture the particle went, also with probability one, through the disjoint slit B?
Why should we take either picture seriously, given the other?
It is pertinent to note here that one of the merits of the consistent histories formal-
ism, in the view of its earliest proponents[1,4,5], is the fact that it, unlike the Copenhagen
interpretation, accommodates their intuitions about the behaviour of microsystems in be-
tween observations. For example, the formalism allows us to say | albeit only as one of
an innite number of incompatible descriptions | that a particle observed at a particular
detector was travelling towards that detector before the observation, and that a particle
measured to have spin component x = sx had that spin before the measurement took
place. As Griths and Omnes note, informal discussions of quantum experiments are
often framed in terms which, if taken literally, suggest that we can make this sort of state-
ment about microsystems before a measurement is carried out. (\Was the beam correctly
aligned going into the second interferometer?", or \Do you think something crazy in the
electronics might have triggered [detector] number 3 just before the particle got there?"[1],
for example.) Their intuition is that a good interpretation of quantum theory ought to
give a way of allowing us to take such statements literally.11
This view is, of course, highly controversial: most interpretations of quantum theory
imply that any description of a microsystem before a measurement is carried out is inde-
pendent of the result of that measurement. However, to the extent that any intuition is
oered as a justication of the formalism, it seems reasonable, at the very least, to weigh
in the balance the fact that the formalism violates other strongly held intuitions. Few
experimenters, after all, can ever have intuitively concluded that the entire flux of their
beam can sensibly be thought of as following any of several macroscopically distinct paths
through the apparatus. Yet it is easy to construct simple experiments in which this is what
the formalism says.
The second | and, I think, deeper | problem is that it seems very hard to justify
the distinction, which consistent historians are forced to draw, between contradictory in-
ferences, which are regarded as a priori unacceptable, and contrary inferences, which are
regarded as unproblematic. Some justication seems called for, since the distinction is
not an accidental feature: it is not that the formalism, for unrelated reasons, simply hap-
pens to exclude one type of inference and include the other. The denition of consistency
11 Note, incidentally, that this sort of justication is not always available in the ordered con-
sistent histories formalism introduced below, as the relevant consistent sets are not necessarily
ordered consistent. I am grateful to Bob Griths for correspondence on this point.
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is motivated precisely by the notion that, when two dierent sets allow a calculation of
the probability of the same event (belonging, in the simplest case, to a single history in
one set and a combination of two histories in the other), the calculations should agree.
This requires in particular that contradictory propositions P and (1 − P ) can never be
inferred, since if the probability of P is one in any set, it must be one in all sets, and so
the probability of (1− P ) must be zero in all sets.
It should be stressed that this last requirement is not absolutely forced on us, sensible
though it may seem. No logical contradiction arises in an interpretation of quantum
theory which follows the basic interpretational ideas of the consistent histories formalism
but which accepts all complete sets of disjoint quantum histories, whether consistent or
not, as dening valid pictures of physics[6]. In this \inconsistent histories" interpretation,
contradictory inferences can generally be made by using dierent pictures. This possibility
is excluded by a deliberate theoretical choice.
It seems natural, then, having made this choice, to look for ways in which contrary
inferences can similarly be excluded. This, at any rate, is the line of thought pursued
below.
It is possible, of course, to maintain that the contrary inferences of the consistent
histories formalism, and the distinction between contrary inferences and contradictory
inferences, are newly revealed features of quantum theory, and that they merely show how
misguided intuitions based on classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics can
be. But in the present state of our understanding this is just to beg the question: are they
features of a useful or sensible interpretation of quantum theory?
It should also be stressed, however, that while the problem of contrary inferences is
| for those who share the view that it is a problem | sucient to motivate the ideas
introduced below, it is not a necessary motivation. Whether or not one believes there is
necessarily anything wrong with the consistent histories formalism, it is interesting that
an alternative formalism can be relatively simply dened. It seems fruitful to ask which, if
either, is to be preferred, and why. And, as Section 8 explains, ordered consistent sets raise
independently interesting questions about the quasiclassical world we actually observe.
5. Relation of Contrary Inferences and Subspace Implications
It is easy to see that contrary inferences in the consistent histories formalism always
arise because of a violation of subspace implications. A contrary inference arises when
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there exist two consistent sets, S1 and S2, both containing a history H, with the property
that there are orthogonal propositions P1 and P2 which are implied by H in the respective
sets, so that | temporarily adding set suces for clarity | we have
pS1(P1jH) = pS2(P2jH) = 1 : (5:1)
Now pS2((1− P2)jH) = 0, and since the probabilities are set-independent and pS1(P1jH)
is nonzero, we cannot have P1 = 1− P2. Hence, since P1 and P2 are orthogonal, we have
that P1 < 1 − P2. Since p(P1jH) = 1 and p((1 − P2)jH) = 0, this pair of projections
violates subspace implications.
In other words, contrary inferences imply that it is possible to nd consistent histories
H and H 0, belonging to dierent consistent sets and agreeing on all but one projector, such
that H has non-zero probability, H 0 has zero probability, and H < H 0. This is illustrated
by the histories H = fPb+ ; Pcg and H
0 = f(1−Pb−); Pcg above. In this example, according
to the consistent histories formalism, an observation of the datum Pb+ cannot be taken
to imply an observation of the strictly larger projector (1− Pb−). To make that inference
would lead directly to a contradiction, in the form of the realisation of a probability zero
history, if Pc were subsequently observed.
The above example requires only a three-dimensional quantum system, prepared in
one state, isolated for a while, and later observed in another state. This can, of course,
easily be realised in the laboratory: the projections Pb can be thought of, for example,
as statements that a spin-1 particle was in one or another of two orthogonal spin states,
or | modifying the example a little | that a particle went through the rst or second
slit in a three-slit interference experiment. It is easy, thus, to nd examples of contrary
inferences describing unobserved properties of quantum systems.
It should be stressed, though, that it is by no means obvious that this or any similar
example can directly be translated into a failure of subspace implications at the level
of macroscopic physics | in, for example, a realistic consistent histories description of
observations of laboratory experiments. That general consistent histories violate subspace
implications need not imply that the particular consistent histories used to recover standard
descriptions of real world physics do so. It might, in any case, not universally be agreed
that the failure of subspace implications, even in the description of realistic observations,
is necessarily a flaw. However, the hypothesis that we are forced to abandon subspace
implications is an extremely radical one, as the next section explains, and it is interesting
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to ask whether there might be any alternative treatment of quantum theory within the
consistent histories framework which respects standard implications, at least when they
relate two consistent histories. The next section suggests such a treatment, and section
8 discusses its relevance to real world quasiclassical physics. The intervening section 7
comments on an earlier discussion of ordering and quantum histories by Isham and Linden.
6. Ordered Consistent Sets of Histories
We have already seen that the mathematical structures of quantum theory dene
a natural partial ordering for each of the standard representations of quantum histories
in the consistent histories approach. By using the initial density matrix to dene the
probability weight, we dene a second natural partial ordering: let us write H  H 0 if
p(H) < p(H 0). The violation of subspace implications reflects the disagreement between
these two orderings in the consistent histories formalism. Thus, in the example given in
section 4, we have both H < H 0 and H  H 0.
Similar orderings can be dened for any version of quantum theory which uses a stan-
dard representation of quantum histories in a closed system and which assigns a probability
weight to histories. I would suggest that any version of closed system quantum theory in
which the two orderings disagree leads to radical new interpretational problems.
The fundamental problem is that, supposing that the world we experience is described
by one particular realised quantum history, we never know | no matter how precise we
try to make our observations | exactly what form that history takes. This is not only
because we can never completely eliminate imprecision from our experimental observa-
tions. A deeper problem is that we have no theoretical understanding of how, precisely,
an observation should be represented within quantum theory. We do not know precisely
when and where any given observation takes place. Nor do we know whether is fundamen-
tally correct to represent quantum events by projection operators, by quantum eects, by
statements associated to space-time regions in path integral quantum theory, or in some
other way | let alone precisely which operator, eect, or statement correctly represents
any given event. As a result, we are always forced into guesswork and approximation. We
are forced to assume, at least as a working hypothesis, that we can nd sensible bounds on
our observations. Roughly speaking, we assume that we can say, at least, that a photon
hit our photographic plate within a certain region, that the observed flux from a distant
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star was in a certain range, and so forth.12 We assume also that the probability of the
actual observations | whose precise form we do not know | is bounded by the probability
of the observations as we approximately represent them. These assumptions ultimately
rely on the agreement of two orderings just mentioned: when those orderings disagree, we
therefore run into new problems.
It is easy to see, in particular, that this sort of problem arises in any careful consistent
histories treatment of quantum cosmology. Suppose, for example, that we have a sequence
of cosmological events which we wish to represent theoretically, in order to calculate their
probability, given some theory of the boundary conditions. Assuming that the basic prin-
ciples of the consistent histories formalism are correct, we know that these events should
be represented by some history H belonging to some consistent set S. We do not, however,
know the precise form of H or of S: the events are given to us as empirical observations
rather than as mathematical constructs.
The best we can then do, following the general principles of the consistent histories
formalism, is choose some plausible consistent set S0 containing histories Hmin and Hmax
which we guess to have the property Hmin < H < Hmax: in particular, thus, we choose
Hmin < Hmax. Since Hmin and Hmax belong to the same set, we have that p(Hmin) <
p(Hmax). It might naively be hoped that we can derive that p(Hmin) < p(H) < p(Hmax),
but since H in general will belong to a dierent consistent set from Hmin and Hmax,
this does not generally follow. There is no way to bound p(H), except (in principle) by
performing the enormous task of explicitly calculating the probabilities of all consistent
histories bounded by Hmin and Hmax, and there is no way to justify the type of subspace
implication | relating observations and true data | that we generally take for granted.
This is not to say that the disagreement of the two orderings necessarily leads to
logical contradiction. Versions of quantum theory in which the orderings disagree need not
be inconsistent, or even impossible to test precisely. They do, though, generally seem to
require us to identify precisely the correct representation of our observations in quantum
theory. This, of course, is generally a far from trivial problem: how are we to tell, a
priori, exactly which projection operators represent the results of a series of quantum
measurements? It is not impossible to imagine that theoretical criteria could be found
which solve the problem, but we certainly do not have such criteria at present.
12 In fact, of course, such statements are generally made within statistical condence limits.
To consider statistical statements would complicate the discussion a little, but does not alter the
underlying point.
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There is, however, a natural way which might | depending on the details of the ap-
proach | get around this problem, which is to restrict attention to collections of quantum
histories on which the two orderings do not disagree.
To implement this idea in the framework of the consistent histories formalism, we
begin at the level of individual quantum histories, dening an ordered consistent history,
H, to be a consistent history with the properties that:
(i) for all consistent histories H 0 with H 0  H we have that p(H 0)  p(H);
(ii) for all consistent histories H 0 with H 0  H we have that p(H 0)  p(H).
We recall here that a consistent history is any quantum history which belongs to some
consistent set of histories. Properties (i) and (ii) hold trivially for histories H and H 0 which
belong to the same consistent set: it is the comparison across dierent sets which makes
them useful constraints.
We can now dene an ordered consistent set of histories to be a complete set of
exclusive alternative histories, each of which is ordered consistent. We can then dene an
ordered consistent histories approach to quantum theory in the obvious way, adopting the
probability weight and other denitions of the consistent histories approach, and simply
declaring by at that only ordered consistent sets of histories are to be considered.13
Clearly, in the cosmological example discussed earlier, we can bound the probability
of the realised history, without knowing its precise form, if we assume that it belongs to
an ordered consistent set. However, we have not as yet shown that ordered consistent sets
exist, still less that it might be reasonable to assume that a physically realised history
is ordered consistent. The second point will be addressed later; the following lemmas |
which apply to the projection operator formulation of consistent histories | answer the
rst.14
Lemma 1: Any consistent history H = fP1; : : : ; Png dened by a series of pro-
jections which include a minimal projection Pj , so that Pi  Pj for all i, is an ordered
consistent history.
13 There are other collections of quantum histories on which the orderings do not disagree. For
example, if all the consistent histories H that violate (i) are eliminated, the remainder form a
collection on which the orderings do not disagree and which is not obviously identical to the ordered
consistent histories, and similarly for (ii). It would be interesting to explore other possibilities,
but we restrict attention to the ordered consistent histories here.
14 I am grateful to Bob Griths for suggesting a slight extension of Lemma 1.
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Proof: Suppose H 0 = fP 01; : : : ; P
0
ng is a larger history than H, and write P
0
i =
Pj +Qi. We have that




1 : : : P
0
n)
= Tr((Pj +Qn) : : : (Pj +Q1)(Pj +Q1) : : : (Pj +Qn))




Now suppose that H 0 is smaller than H. Then in particular P 0j  Pj and we have that




Lemma 2: Let S = f1; : : : ; ng be a consistent set of histories dened by a series
of projective decompositions, of which one, j , has the property that for each projection
P in j , and for every i, we have that there is precisely one projection Q in i with the
property that Q  P (so that all of the other projections in i are contrary to P ). Then
S is an ordered consistent set of histories.
Proof: Each of the histories of non-zero probability in S satises the conditions
of Lemma 1 and so is ordered consistent. Each of the histories of zero probability in S is
of the form H = f: : : ; P; : : : ; Q; : : :g, where P and Q are contrary projections. Now any
consistent history smaller than H therefore also contains a pair of contrary projections
P 0  P and Q0  Q. By the consistency axioms, its probability is less than or equal to
Tr(Q0P 0P 0Q0) = 0, and thus must also be zero. Hence H is ordered consistent, since of
course any consistent history larger than H has probability greater than or equal to zero.
7. Comments on Ordering and Decoherence Functionals
It may be helpful, before going further, to make some comments on an earlier discus-
sion of quantum history orderings, given by Isham and Linden in Sec. IV of their pioneering
paper developing an abstract algebraic approach to decoherence functionals[17].
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Isham and Linden abstract the basic ideas of the consistent histories formalism in the
following way. First, the space UP of history propositions is taken to be a mathematical
structure | an orthoalgebra | with a series of operations and relations obeying certain
axioms. In particular, they propose that a partial ordering  and an orthogonality relation
? should be dened on UP and should obey natural rules, and that UP should include an
identity history 1.
They then introduce a space D of decoherence functionals, dened to be maps from
UPUP to the complex numbers satisfying certain axioms, and go on to consider whether
the axioms dening decoherence functionals should include axioms relating to the ordering
in UP .
In the language of standard quantum mechanics, UP corresponds to the space of all
the quantum histories (not only the consistent histories) for a given system, whose Hilbert
space and hamiltonian are xed. Any of several representations of quantum histories
could be considered: the relevant part of Isham and Linden’s discussion uses the simplest
representation of quantum histories, as sequences of projection operators.
The standard quantum mechanical decoherence functional (as appears on the left
hand side of (3.2) ) is a member of the space D in the minimal axiom system Isham and
Linden eventually choose. As they remark, though, it would not be a member of D if the
extra ordering axioms they discuss were imposed. Isham and Linden nonetheless consider
imposing these ordering axioms, since their aim in the relevant discussion is to investigate
generalised algebraic and logical schemes rather than to propose a formalism applicable to
standard quantum theory. (They suggest, at the end of section IV, that standard quantum
theory might perhaps emerge from some such generalised scheme in an appropriate limit.)
Isham and Linden were, as far as I am aware, the rst to investigate possible uses of
orderings in developing the consistent histories formalism. It is worth stressing, though,
to avoid any possible confusion, that their suggestions pursue the exploration of orderings
in a direction orthogonal to the one considered in the present paper. In this paper we
restrict attention to standard quantum theory, and propose an alternative histories for-
malism within that theory, using the standard quantum theoretic decoherence functional
throughout. We note also that the subspace implications which underlie our basic scien-
tic worldviews depend for their justication on the assumption that the quasiclassical
set describing the physics we observe is an ordered consistent set. Isham and Linden’s
proposed ordering axioms, on the other hand, exclude standard quantum theory and the
standard decoherence functional: they are possible postulates which might be imposed
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on non-standard generalised decoherence functionals in non-standard generalisations of
quantum theory.
Isham and Linden give a minimal set of postulated properties for generalised decoher-
ence functionals:
d(0; ) = 0 for all  2 UP ;
d(; ) = d(; ) for all ;  2 UP ;
d(; )  0 for all  2 UP ;
if  ? then; for all γ ; d( ; γ) = d(; γ) + d(; γ) ;
d(1; 1) = 1 :
(7:1)
They then consider imposing new postulates on decoherence functionals. The rst of
these | their posited inequality 1 | is that:
for all d 2 D and for all ;  with    we have d(; )  d(; ) : (7:2)
As Isham and Linden go on to point out, there are familiar examples in standard
quantum theory in which (7.2) is violated for a pair of histories    in which one of the
histories (in their case ) is inconsistent.15
Two further postulates on generalised decoherence functionals are also posited:
 ?  implies d(; ) + d(; )  1 for all d 2 D ; (7:3)
and
for all d 2 D and all γ 2 UP we have d(γ; γ)  1 : (7:4)
Isham and Linden give examples to show that, in standard quantum theory, with the
standard decoherence functional, inconsistent histories do not necessarily respect these
inequalities either.
Again, the dierence from the examples considered in the present paper is worth
emphasizing. All of the examples Isham and Linden consider involve inconsistent histories
| which are, of course, all that they require in order to investigate possible properties of
15 The suggestion that inequality 1 is true when applied to sequences of projectors onto subsets
of conguration space in a path-integral quantum theory is thus misleading: it is easy to nd
conguration space analogues of these examples. I am grateful to Chris Isham and Noah Linden
for discussions of this point.
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decoherence functionals applied to arbitrary, not necessarily consistent, quantum histories.
These examples are not problematic for the consistent histories approach to quantum
theory, according to which the inconsistent histories have no physical signicance, and they
do not give rise to new interpretational questions in any conventional quantum histories
approach, for essentially the same reason. The discussion in the present paper, on the
other hand, looks at the properties of consistent histories in standard quantum theory: we
have argued that their failure to respect ordering relations is problematic and explained
that it does raise new questions.
Suppose now that we set aside Isham and Linden’s motivations, and alter their order-
ing postulates so that they apply, not to generalised decoherence functionals applied to all
quantum histories in an abstract generalisation of quantum theory, but to the standard
decoherence functional applied to ordered consistent histories in standard quantum theory.
We then obtain the following:
for all ;  with    we have d(; )  d(; ) ; (7:5)
 ?  implies d(; ) + d(; )  1 ; (7:6)
and
for all γ we have d(γ; γ)  1 : (7:7)
Here d is the standard decoherence functional, ,  and γ are now taken to be ordered
consistent histories, and  ?  means that  and  are disjoint | i.e., there is at least
one time at which their respective events are represented by contrary projections.
The rst of these equations holds by the denition of an ordered consistent history,
but it might perhaps be hoped that the others could restrict the class of histories further.
However, the second equation also holds for all ordered consistent histories. To see this,
note that  ?  implies that   (1−), and that if  is a consistent history then (1−)
is too. The fact that  is ordered consistent thus implies that
p()  p(1− ) = 1− p() : (7:8)
The third equation, moreover, holds for all consistent histories, ordered or otherwise. It
seems, then, that ordered consistency may be the strongest natural criterion that can be
dened using the basic ingredients of consistency and ordering.
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8. Ordered Consistent Sets and Quasiclassicality
A key idea in Gell-Mann and Hartle’s discussion of the consistent histories formalism,
as it applies to cosmology, is the denition of a particularly interesting class of consistent
sets, known as quasiclassical domains. Loosely speaking, a quasiclassical domain is sup-
posed to be the sort of consistent set capable of describing the macroscopic world in terms
of approximately classical variables. Gell-Mann and Hartle characterise it as follows[3]:
\Roughly speaking, a quasiclassical domain should be a set of alternative decoher-
ing histories, maximally rened consistent with decoherence, with its individual
histories exhibiting as much as possible patterns of classical correlation in time.
Such histories cannot be exactly correlated in time according to classical laws be-
cause sometimes their classical evolution is disturbed by quantum events. There
are no classical domains, only quasiclassical ones.
: : :
The impression that there is something like a classical domain suggests that
we try to dene quasiclassical domains precisely by searching for a measure of
classicity for each of the maximal sets of alternative decohering histories and
concentrating on the one (or ones) with maximal classicity. Such a measure : : :
should favor predictability, involving patterns of classical correlation as described
above. It should also favor maximal sets of alternative decohering histories that
are relatively ne-grained as opposed to those which had to be carried to very
coarse graining before they would give decoherence. We are searching for such a
measure. It should provide a precise and quantitative meaning to the notion of
quasiclassical domain.
: : :
What are the projection operators that specify the coarse graining of a maxi-
mal set of alternative histories with high classicity, which denes a quasiclassical
domain? They will include, as mentioned above, projections onto comparable
ranges of values of certain operators at sequences of times, obeying roughly clas-
sical equations of motion, subject to fluctuations that cause their trajectories to
fan out from time to time. We can refer to these operators, which habitually
decohere, as ‘quasiclassical operators’. What these quasiclassical operators are,
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and how many of them there are, depends not only on H and , but also on the
epoch, on the spatial region, and on previous branchings."
Arguments for the physical relevance of the consistent histories approach rely on the
hypothesis that there is always at least one approximately consistent set describing quasi-
classical physics in any sensible model of situations in which quasiclassicality is empirically
observed[3]. This seems plausible since environmental decoherence, which seems unavoid-
able in quasiclassically evolving systems, generally ensures the approximate consistency
of the relevant set[e.g. 10,30]. When it holds true, parameter-counting arguments suggest
that at least one exactly consistent quasiclassical set can also always be found[6].
While there have been several useful illustrations of the properties of quasiclassical
sets of histories in simple models[e.g. 30,31,32], it is generally agreed that much remains to
be understood about quasiclassicality. Part of the problem is that a direct investigation of
quasiclassicality in real world cosmology is hopelessly impractical, and it has not been en-
tirely clear precisely what questions should be addressed in simpler models. Aside from the
motivations discussed earlier, it would be very interesting to understand the relationship
between ordered consistency and quasiclassicality for this reason alone.
The rst question, clearly, is whether quasiclassical domains should generally be ex-
pected to be ordered consistent sets. If not, the next question would be whether the
histories in a quasiclassical domain are generally ordered when compared to histories be-
longing to other consistent sets dened by projections onto ranges of the same quasiclassical
variables. For example, can we show that consistent histories dened by projections onto
ranges of densities for chemical species in small volumes are generally ordered with respect
to one another? If so, then the type of subspace implication which is generally used in
analyses of observations could still be justied. Finally, if either of the previous two prop-
erties fail to hold exactly, it would be useful to know whether they hold approximately
| in which case subspace implications cause only small errors | and more generally to
characterise quantitatively the extent to which they fail.
Answering these questions denitively may require | and, it might perhaps be hoped,
help to nd | a deeper understanding of quasiclassicality than is available to us at present.
At any rate, I do not presently know the answers, and can only oer the questions as
interesting ones whose answers clearly have signicant implications.
However, we can at least try to examine whether the criterion of ordered consis-
tency is compatible with our understanding of quasiclassicality in simple models. Here
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the conclusions seem tentatively encouraging, in that the consistent sets associated with a
quasiclassical description of physics tend to be ordered consistent.
As a simple example, consider the following model of a series of successive measure-
ments of the spin of a spin-1=2 particle about various axes. We use a vector notation for
the particle states, so that if u is a unit vector in R3 the eigenstates of :u are represented
by j  ui. With the analogy of a pointer state in mind, we use the basis fj "ik; j #ikg
to represent the kth environment particle state, together with the linear combinations
jik = (j "ik  j #ik)=
p
2. We compactify the notation by writing environment states as
single kets, so that for example j "i1 ⊗    ⊗ j "in is written as j " : : : "i, and we take the
initial state j (0)i to be jvi ⊗ j " : : : "i.
The interaction between the system and the kth environment particle is chosen so that
it corresponds to a measurement of the system spin along the uk direction, so that the
states evolve as follows:
juki ⊗ j "ik ! juki ⊗ j "ik ;
j−uki ⊗ j "ik ! j−uki ⊗ j #ik :
(8:1)
A simple unitary operator that generates this evolution is
Uk(t) = P (uk)⊗ Ik + P (−uk)⊗ exp(−ik(t)Fk) ; (8:2)
where P (x) = jxihxj and Fk = ij #ikh" jk − ij "ikh# jk. Here k(t) is a function dened
for each particle k, which varies from 0 to =2 and represents how far the interaction has
progressed. We dene Pk() = jikhjk, so that Fk = Pk(+)− Pk(−).
The Hamiltonian for this interaction is thus
Hk(t) = i _Uk(t)U
y
k(t) =
_k(t)P (−uk)⊗ Fk ; (8:3)
in both the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures. We write the extension of Uk to the total
Hilbert space as
Vk = P (uk)⊗I1⊗  ⊗In+P (−uk)⊗I1⊗  ⊗Ik−1⊗exp(−ik(t)Fk)⊗Ik+1⊗  ⊗In : (8:4)
We take the system particle to interact initially with particle 1 and then with consecutively
numbered ones, and there is no interaction between environment particles, so that the
evolution operator for the complete system is
U(t) = Vn(t) : : : V1(t) ; (8:5)
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with each factor aecting only the Hilbert spaces of the system and one of the environment
spins.
We suppose, nally, that the interactions take place in disjoint time intervals and that





and we have that 1(t) > 0 for t > 0 and that, if 0 < k(t) < =2, then i(t) =
=2 for all i < k and i(t) = 0 for all i > k.
This model has been used elsewhere[9,33] in order to explore algorithms which might
select a single physically natural consistent set when the physics is determined by the
simplest type of system-environment interaction. It is particularly well suited to such
an analysis, since the dynamics are chosen so as to allow a simple and quite elegant
classication[33] of all the consistent sets built from projections onto subspaces dened by
the Schmidt decomposition. Apart from this, though, the model is unexceptional | one
of the simpler variants among the many models used in the literature to investigate the
decoherence of system states by measurement-type interactions with an environment.
To give a physical interpretation of the model, we take it that the environment
\pointer" variables assume denite values after their respective interactions with the sys-
tem. That is, after the kth interaction, the kth environment particle is in one of the states
j "ik and j #ik: the probabilities of each of these outcomes, of course, depend on the out-
come of the previous measurement (or, in the case of the rst measurement, on the initial
state) via the standard quantum mechanical expressions.
This description can be recovered from the consistent histories formalism by choosing
the consistent set S1, dened by the decompositions
fI ⊗ j1i1h1j1 ⊗ I ⊗    ⊗ I : 1 =" or #g at time t1 ;
fI ⊗ j1i1h1j1 ⊗ j2i2h2j2 ⊗    ⊗ I : 1; 2 =" or #g at time t2 ;
: : :
fI ⊗ j1i1h1j1 ⊗ j2i2h2j2 ⊗    ⊗ jninhnjn : 1; 2; : : : ; n =" or #g at time tn :
(8:7)
26
Clearly, the histories of non-zero probability in S1 take the form
H1;:::;n = fI ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗    ⊗ I;
I ⊗ j1i1h1j1 ⊗ I ⊗    ⊗ I;
I ⊗ j1i1h1j1 ⊗ j2i2h2j2 ⊗ I ⊗    ⊗ I;
: : : ;
I ⊗ j1i1h1j1 ⊗ j2i2h2j2 ⊗    ⊗ jninhnjng ;
(8:8)
for sequences f1; : : : ; ng, each element of which takes the value " or #. Their probabilities,
dened by the decoherence functional, are precisely those which would be obtained from











where, letting 0 =", we dene ai = 1 if i and i−1 take the same value, and ai = −1
otherwise.
Now S1 is dened by a nested sequence of increasingly rened projective decompo-
sitions, all of whose projections commute | a relation which is unaltered by moving to
the Heisenberg picture. It therefore satises the conditions of Lemma 2 above, and so is
ordered consistent.
This argument clearly generalizes: in any situation in which Hilbert space factorizes
into system and environment degrees of freedom, where the self-interactions of the latter
are negligible, any consistent set dened by nested commuting projections onto the en-
vironment variables is ordered consistent. The model considered above is a particularly
crude example: more sophisticated, and phenomenologically somewhat more plausible,
examples of this type are analysed in, for example, Refs. [10,30].
No sweeping conclusion can be drawn from this, since it is generally agreed that
familiar quasiclassical physics is not well described in general | at least in any obvious
way | by models of this type. (Again, a detailed discussion of the limitations of such
models can be found in Refs. [10,30].) In other words, while it would be hard to defend
the hypothesis that familiar quasiclassical sets are generally ordered consistent if sets of
the type S1 were not, the fact that they are is certainly not sucient evidence. It would
be good to nd sharper tests of the hypothesis, perhaps for example by developing further
the phenomenological investigations of quasiclassicality pursued in Ref. [10]. Meanwhile,
the questions raised earlier in this section remain unresolved.
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On the other hand, it would be dicult to make a watertight case that ordered
consistent sets are denitely inadequate to describe real-world physics, for the following
reason. First, it seems hard to exclude the possibility that the initial state is pure, so let us
temporarily suppose that it is:  = j ih j. As Gell-Mann and Hartle point out[30], we can
then associate to every consistent set of histories, S, a nested set of commuting projections
dening what they term generalized records. The consistent set denes a resolution of the




P inn : : : P
i1
1 j i ; (8:10)
which are guaranteed to be orthogonal by the consistency condition (3.2). We can thus
nd at least one set of orthogonal projection operators fRIg, indexed by sets of the form
I = fi1 : : : ing, which project onto the history vectors and sum to the identity:
Ri1:::in j i = P
in
n : : : P
i1
1 j i ;X
I
RI = I ;
RIRJ = IJRJ :
(8:11)
We can thus[30] construct a set S0, with the same history vectors and the same probabilities
as S, built from a nested sequence of commuting projections dened by sums of the RI .
And, as we have seen, sets of this type are ordered consistent.
Of course, there is no reason to expect the projections dening the set S0 to be
closely related to those dening S. In particular, the fact that S is a quasiclassical domain
certainly does not imply that S0 is likely to be: its projections are not generally likely
to be interpretable in terms of familiar variables. But, as we have already noted, we
have no theoretical criterion which identies a particular consistent set, or a particular
type of variable, as fundamentally correct for representing the events we observe. The
set S0 correctly identies the history vectors and predicts their probabilities, and we thus
could not say for certain (given that we presently have no theory of set selection) that its
description of physics is fundamentally incorrect, while that given by S is fundamentally
correct.
To make this observation, of course, is merely to point out a logical possibility. In fact,
it would be extremely puzzling if the more complicated and apparently derivative set S0
were in some sense more fundamental than the associated quasiclassical domain S. And,
of course, even if this were somehow understood to be true in principle, we would still need
to understand the relationship between between ordered consistency and quasiclassicality
in order to say whether or not standardly used subspace inferences are in fact justiable.
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9. Conclusions
Though the criterion of ordering seems mathematically natural, both in the consis-
tent histories approach to quantum theory and in other possible treatments of quantum
histories, it raises very unconventional questions. It seems, though, that these questions
cannot be avoided in any precise formulation of the quantum theory of a closed system
which involves a standard representation of quantum events and which gives a historical
account.
There seem to be three possibilities, each of which is interesting. The rst is that the
representations of quantum histories discussed here, though standard, are not those chosen
by nature. Clearly this is a possibility: there are, for example, well known non-standard
versions of quantum theory[34], and related theories[35], in which histories are dened by
trajectories or other auxiliary variables, and in which subspace implications follow just as
in classical physics.
The second possibility is that our quasiclassical domain can be shown to be an ordered
consistent set. If so, then the ordered consistent histories approach is both predictively
stronger than the standard consistent histories approach | since there are fewer ordered
consistent sets | and compatible with empirical observation, and hence superior as a
predictive theory. If it is compatible with our observations, the ordered consistent histories
approach would seem at least as natural as the consistent histories approach.
Even if so, I would not suggest that the ordered consistent histories formalism is
the \right" interpretation of quantum theory, and the consistent histories approach the
\wrong" one. The ordered consistent histories approach seems almost certain to suer from
many of the same defects as the consistent histories approach, since there are still far too
many ordered consistent sets. The aim here is thus not to propose the ordered consistent
histories approach as a plausible fundamental interpretation of quantum theory, but to
suggest that the range of natural and useful mathematical denitions of types of quantum
history is wider than previously understood. This range includes, at least, Goldstein
and Page’s criterion of linear positivity[36], the various consistency criteria[1,10,30] in the
literature, and the criterion of ordered consistency introduced here. It seems to me hard to
justify taking any of these criteria as dening the fundamentally correct interpretation of
quantum theory. On the one hand, physically interesting quantum histories might possibly
satisfy any one, or none, of them; on the other hand, most quantum histories satisfying any
given criterion seem unlikely to be physically interesting | and precisely which criteria
are useful in which circumstances largely remains to be understood.
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The third possibility is that our quasiclassical domain is not an ordered consistent set.
This would have intriguing theoretical implications. We would have, at least in principle,
to abandon subspace inferences, and we would ultimately need to understand precisely
how to characterise the quantum events which constitute the history we observe. This
would raise profound and not easily answerable questions about how we can tell what,
precisely, are our empirical observations. It might also, depending on the way in which
ordered consistency was violated, and the extent of any violation, raise signicant practical
problems in the analysis of those observations.
No compelling argument in favour of any one of these possibilities has been given here:
it has been shown only that, if quasiclassical sets generally fail to be ordered consistent,
they do so in a way too subtle to be displayed in the simplest models.
Another caveat is that the above discussion applied the criterion of ordered consistency
only to the simplest representation of quantum histories, in which individual events are
represented by projections at a single time. Other representations need to be considered
case by case, and our conclusions might not necessarily generalize. For example, the fact
that a consistent history built from single time projections is ordered when compared to
consistent histories of the same type does not necessarily imply that it is ordered when
compared to consistent histories dened by composite events.
Still, the criterion of ordered consistency denes a new version of the consistent his-
tories formulation of quantum theory, which avoids the problems caused by contrary in-
ferences. Its other properties and implications largely remain to be understood.
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